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1. Introduction 
The most recent economic downturn and the current economic conditions faced by the 
United States‟ economy throw light on the importance of macroeconomic variables as well as 
the factors driving such variables. The recent crisis can be appropriately described as a 
liquidity trap; wherein high levels of unemployment and alarmingly low interest rates render 
monetary policy completely ineffective. Economists have studied such crises in prolonged 
detail to unfold optimal solutions for freeing economies from such adverse economic 
conditions. Most academic literature indicates that inflation expectations are a crucial means of 
affecting real inflation in an economy and the central bank must be able to credibly shift 
inflation expectations in order to implement monetary policy effectively during liquidity crises.  
 Figure 1: US Short Term Government Bond Yields and Zero-Interest-Rate Policy 
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Figure 1 displays the nominal yield on the 3 month, 1 year and 2 year government Treasury 
bill. The zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) occurs immediately after the explosion of the housing 
bubble in 2008. This policy implementation hinders the Federal Reserve‟s ability to effectively 
conduct a monetary policy expansion.   
 This research aims to utilize the canonical models of how expectations are formed to 
determine which variables would significantly affect how forecasters build future price 
expectations. The motivation behind discovering how these expectations are formed is to be 
able to gauge how large of an effect macroeconomic variables have on inflation forecasts. By 
using a simple model of the economy, this thesis will test the size and magnitude of changes in 
the independent variables on the different economic agents‟ inflation expectations. By 
examining the quarterly shift in variables such as the federal funds rate, M1 and M2 monetary 
aggregates and the yield on the ten year and thirty year government treasuries, this paper will 
aim to capture the relationship that they share with inflation forecasts made by consumers, 
professional economists, the market and those made by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland.   
2. Literature Review 
A liquidity trap can be characterized as a shock to the economy, which results in zero bound 
nominal interest rates and an significantly low level of employment, rendering monetary policy 
almost completely ineffective. At such low levels of interest, there is assumed to be an almost 
perfect substitutability between money and bonds because depositor‟s are unwilling to pay an 
almost negative interest rate for their savings. The underlying assumption behind open market 
operations is that money is neutral, and hence an increase in the monetary base should have a 
positive effect on the price level in an economy. We face a conundrum because during a liquidity 
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trap, the monetary base is almost completely ineffective and therefore unable to affect output and 
prices in an economy. The solution to this problem is extremely simple; an increase in the money 
supply in the current and future periods will raise prices in the proprotionally. There is no 
corresponding argument that a rise in the money supply that is not expected to be sustained will 
raise prices equiproportionally
1
. To put this simply, as Krugman points at in his paper „Its 
Baaack: Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap‟ if consumers are not expecting 
there to be a change in the monetary aggregates, they will not change their inflation expectations. 
He outlines the principal problem as one of inverse credibility where central bankers find it 
challenging to convince private agents of a convergence toward price stability. His results hint 
that unlike traditional liquidity traps in which monetary policy is completely ineffective, the 
central bank can implement monetary policy, if it credibly promises to be irresponsible and seek 
a higher future level. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) built a model which outlines the 
responses of a central bank to an exogenous shock in aggregate demand that lowers the short-
term interest rate consistently with full employment from 4 percent to -2 percent for a random 
number of quarters, after which the rate reverts back to normal. Given that rates cannot go below 
zero, the optimal policy in such a shock would be to keep short-term nominal interest rates low 
for more than 5 quarters after the interest rate returns to its natural rate. By doing so, there is a 
mild spurt of inflation in the economy that marginally increases output levels. A credible 
commitment to behave in this way after the zero bound has ceased to bind drastically reduces the 
price and output decline that occurs during the period when the central bank is constrained by the 
zero bound. Therefore, by shocking this model exogenously, they were able to predict the 
behavior of output and price both during and after a liquidity trap and hence point out that a 
credible commitment by the central bank to hold short term interest rates low could help shift 
                                                          
1 Krugman, Paul R, 1998. 
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future inflation expectations and prevent a large decline in inflation. Their paper also describes 
ways in which other central bank policies may help increase their credibility to commit to an 
inflation target. They demonstrate a dynamic equilibrium game that uses the Markov equilibrium 
model as a purely forward-looking discretionary policy tool to test the reaction of inflation and 
output in the economy on sudden policy changes. The effect of these sudden changes in policy 
proves to be extremely deflationary, since the central banks‟ credibility would arbitrarily 
decrease as they change policy, which would drastically affect inflation expectations for the next 
period. An expectation that the central bank will behave in this fashion results in a deep and 
prolonged contraction of economic activity and a sustained deflation, in the case that the natural 
rate of interest remains negative for several quarters
2
. The authors conclude that policy 
implementation will always be ineffective if it remains purely forward looking then it.  
Peter Morgan‟s paper on unconventional monetary policy helps elucidate the reactions of 
the private sector to the „commitment effect‟ of the central bank. By analyzing a number of 
different empirical studies conducted in Japan on this specific effect, he concludes that these 
reactions are driven by short term interest rate forecasts and they subsequently tend to affect 
longer term inflation rates. The drawback is that such market reactions are not empirically large 
enough to affect expectations about the real economy and hence did not affect these interest rate 
forecasts. On December 16
th
 2008, Ben Bernanke announced that the Federal open markets 
committee (FOMC) anticipated weak economic conditions warranting an extremely low federal 
funds rate.  The effect of the announcement was reflected by a large drop in the one-year T-bill 
rate, signaling that the market was receptive to Bernanke‟s commitment effect.  
                                                          
2 Eggertsson, Gauti, and Michael Woodford, 2003.  
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Morgan points out that this evidence may mean that the drop is indicative of the worsening in the 
US economy, but the differential performance between the one-year and the two-year is 
suggestive that the commitment effect could be strongly correlated to the drop
3
. Morgan‟s paper 
serves as a good empirical basis for testing a theory such as the commitment effect and the 
credibility of an announcement made by the Federal Reserve Bank‟s Chairman would be on the 
future inflation expectations and the demand for government treasuries.  
Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004) share the theory that even under conditions in which 
money and bonds serve as perfect substitutes for each other, open market operations serve as a 
strong monetary policy tool for the government. They use a dynamic equilibrium model to gauge 
the improvement in welfare conditions by the utilization of open market operations in Japan. The 
welfare improvement stems from large scale purchases of the government‟s debt. Similar to 
central bank announcements about the overnight federal funds rate, the Fed‟s commitment to buy 
back large quantities of debt would serve to improve inflation expectations and the significantly 
reduce the future burden of higher payments. However, the major source of uncertainty in bond 
returns is the future behavior of short-term interest rates. If those rates are at zero, they cannot 
fall. If investors cannot envision an eventuality in which short-term rates might rise, then 
investors no longer consider short-term rates to be random at all.
4
 Under that circumstance, it 
would be impossible to generate positive risk premia, hence making money a perfect substitute 
for bonds. However, upon analysis of Japan‟s term structure, they notice positive long run 
interest rates. The conclusion is that consumers have positive expectations about both future 
interest rates and inflation. The paper neither defines the macroeconomic variable nor the 
                                                          
3 Peter Morgan, 2009.  
4 Auerbach, Alan J., and Maurice Obstfeld, 2005.  
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magnitude of the welfare implications on inflation expectations, both faults representing large 
shortcomings in the study.  
In his paper on Central bank communication, Stefano Eusepi discusses how essential a 
role a central bank has in the shaping of market expectations. Through an underlying theory of 
price stickiness, Eusepi studies a simple model based on monetary policy where the participants 
of the market lack complete information about the future decisions of the central bank. His 
findings show that an economy with a central bank that remains non-transparent about their 
policy suffers from “learning equilibria” characterized by lengthened periods of slower growth 
and deflationary prices. Small expectation errors can result in complex economic dynamics, 
inducing welfare-reducing fluctuations.
5
 On the contrary, economies which enjoy transparent 
central banks display a more stable expectation trend around the set inflation target. Therefore, it 
is safe to conclude that information asymmetries that occur during a liquidity crisis affect 
inflation expectations and alter the speed at which the economy can alter inflation.  Eusepi‟s 
paper serves supports this thesis, which will conduct a detailed analysis of what factors 
contribute to the formation of inflation expectations and the magnitude of their effects. Eusepi 
manages to highlight the importance of information asymmetries in an economy and how they 
would subsequently affect inflation.  
Almost all academic papers on this topic point to the fact that monetary policy does not provide a 
sufficiently strong stimulus to relieve an economy from a liquidity trap. Both Japan and the 
United States during its 1930‟s recession struggled to find an optimal solution to the alarmingly 
low interest rates. A fair amount of literature looks at alternatives to the most commonly used 
central bank instruments. Christopher J. Erceg & Jesper Lindé discuss the effects of a fiscal 
                                                          
5 Eusepi, Stefano, 2008. 
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expansion in economies where monetary policy is subject to the zero bound nominal interest rate 
by using a new Keynesian model where households and firms are forward looking. Using this 
model, they find that fiscal stimuli, if implemented in a timely manner, are extremely positive. 
They also find that if the fiscal multiplier has lags in its implementation, leading to an increase in 
distortionary taxes, then it can have the opposite effect on the economy, further slowing down 
economic activity.
6
 The key observation made by this paper is that the efficiency of fiscal 
multipliers depends on expectations on future monetary policy implementation in the periods 
following the economies‟ exit from the liquidity trap.  
For almost any policy implementation, inflation expectations will be crucial in 
determining whether the desired effects are achievable or not. In their paper „Disagreement about 
Inflation Expectations‟, Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers discuss disagreements in price expectations 
between consumers and professional economists. Their hypothesis is based on the theory that 
because information asymmetries exist in the market, agents will have different forecasts of price 
and consequently inflation. Since all the market agents will differ in their forecasts as well as 
make forecasting errors, changes in the money supply are attributed to a relative rather than 
general change in price per producer and hence these agents react by expanding production. 
“Each period only a fraction of the population updates themselves on the current state of the 
economy and determines their optimal actions, taking account of the likely delay until they will 
revisit their plans. This theory generates heterogeneity in expectations because different 
segments of the population will have updated their expectations at different points of time. Their 
model on expectations is based on disagreement which occurs due to a difference in information 
within the market and the dispersion in inflation expectation can be attributed to shifts in 
                                                          
6 Erceg, Christopher, and Jesper Linde.  
 
 
8 
 
expectations. The paper uses the model of stick information on multiple different samples, 
consisting of a mix between professional economists, general public and academic, business, 
finance, market and labor economists”7. The conclusion derived from this paper is crucial to 
understanding how models forecasting inflation differ from the standard macroeconomic models. 
Expectations differ from person to person and the disagreement gives rise to changes in current 
and future inflation. The amount of disagreement is also time sensitive and hence it changes 
significantly with changes in economic variables. The reason that this model is so different from 
those based on both forward looking rational expectations and backward looking adaptive 
expectations is that it measures dispersion in the sample data, and the dispersion is one of the key 
dependent variables that explain a change in expectations. The emphasis of this literature review 
has been heavily based upon liquidity traps in order to highlight the importance of inflation 
expectations in an economy. Since liquidity traps are one instance where an economy‟s only exit 
solution to the zero bound interest rate zone is by augmenting future inflation, understanding 
how these expectations are formed is crucial to understanding how market agents react to 
changes in macroeconomic variables as well as identifying how these expectations shift.  
3. Description of Data  
3.1 Survey of Professional Forecasters and Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and 
Behaviors 
The data set for inflation expectations contains four different categories of forecasters, 
two of which happen to be professional economist and consumers.  The Survey of Professional 
Forecasters, (SPF) and the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behaviors (MSCAB) are 
data sets which have been collected using survey responses of professional economists and 
                                                          
7 Mankiw, Gregory, Ricardo Reis, and Justin Wolfers, 2003.  
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consumers based on their per quarter expectation of the consumer price index (CPI). My data set 
is quarterly, covering from 1980q1 to 2009q1. While I have not been able to procure the raw 
information from the data sets, I have the first and second moments of the distribution of the 
surveys. From these measures, I calculate the first difference of the mean forecast to ensure the 
data series is stationary. This first difference of the mean inflation forecasts is used as my 
dependent variable. 
3.2 Treasury Inflation Protected Securities 
A third measure of inflation expectations, is derived from the Treasury inflation protected 
securities (TIPS) issued by the US government. The TIPS deliver an implicit measure of the 
market‟s inflation expectations by giving us the expected real yield on a bond, while normal 
conventional treasuries give us the nominal yield on a bond. Therefore, by computing the 
difference between the nominal and the real yield, the expected inflation, I was able to derive the 
expected inflation for each quarter. Again, I calculate the first difference of the mean forecast to 
ensure that my data is stationary, and I use this first difference as another dependent variable.    
Y
n – Yr = e, where Yn is the nominal yield on the 10-year conventional treasury and Yr is the 
indexed real yield. 
8
  
There are two shortcomings when utilizing this financial instrument to measure inflation 
expectations. TIPS are adjusted for inflation risk; while conventional treasuries have their real 
return inversely related to actual inflation in the economy and is therefore not protected against 
this risk. “As a result, a conventional security will generally have to carry a higher expected real 
                                                          
8 Shen, Pu, and Jonathan Corning, 2008. 
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yield than an indexed treasury just to be equally attractive to investors.” 9Since TIPS lack the 
premium carried by inflation risk, the yield is adjusted to reflect this difference, which is often 
referred to as an inflation risk premium. The market for conventional bonds is the most liquid 
market in the United States whereas the market for TIPS is significantly smaller and more 
illiquid. Therefore, in order to compensate for the liquidity differential, there is a premium 
attached to TIPS, known as liquidity premium. Hence the yield from these securities is likely to 
be skewed by both the inflation risk and liquidity premium. The underlying assumption while 
using the TIPS as a means of expected inflation forecasts is that both the inflation risk and 
liquidity premium would be the same size so as to counteract the effect of each other. Given the 
controversy behind using TIPS as a means to forecast inflations, I attempted to get the data and 
test it nonetheless. Unfortunately because the data only goes back to 1997, the number of data 
points and the size of the standard errors may counteract my results.  
3.3 Federal Reserve of Cleveland’s Inflation Expectations Model  
Since the TIPS are heavily influenced by both liquidity and risk as aforementioned, the 
Cleveland Federal Reserve builds a data set for inflation expectations that are measured by 
nominal interest rates, inflation swaps, and the two survey forecasts, SPF and MSCAB which are 
used in this research paper. The reason why this model is preferred as a means to measure 
inflation expectations is because it is adjusted for both inflation risk and liquidity premiums. The 
model does accurately adjusts for inflation risk premium by explicitly calculating what the 
average risk premium should be (calculated as 0.5% in their model) and simply subtracting it 
from the expected inflation per quarter. The rationale behind this calculation is that inflation risk 
is associated more with the fear that inflation in the next quarter will deviate from that which is 
                                                          
9
 Shen, Pu, and Jonathan Corning, 2008. 
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expected rather than the fear of higher inflation itself. Hence, the model measures this premium 
and increases the size of the yield on the TIPS. 
The model is also extremely advantageous over the TIPS model of expectations because 
it calculates short term real interest rates, without having to worry about premia associated with 
the TIPS expectations. Short term real interest rates are extremely crucial because comparing 
actual real rates to what the Fed sets to be the natural real rate would allow one to estimate 
whether it is implementing a contractionary or expansionary monetary policy. Therefore, if the 
current real interest rate is above the natural rate set by the Fed, then the policy is contractionary 
and vice versa.  
 I downloaded the data set from the Federal Reserve of Cleveland‟s website and changed 
monthly data to quarterly data from 1982q1 to 2009q1. As before, I use the first difference to 
ensure stationarity.  
Figure 2 displays the correlation between the inflation expectations made by professional 
forecasters and consumers, using a sample period from 1980q1 to 2009q1. While I was able to 
access to the 2010 data, the most recent financial crises skews a number of my variables, and the 
large difference between the first and second order of my variables may also be distorted, 
therefore I chose to drop the last five data points. While the survey forecasts have extremely 
close means, the variance of the consumer forecasts is significantly larger than that made by the 
professional forecasters, leading me to believe that better access to market information would 
support the hypothesis of this paper. Furthermore, Figure 2 reflects the size and variance of the 
two market based expectations and shows the variance of these expectations to be significantly 
larger. The expectations derived from the TIPS have the largest variance due to the 
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aforementioned presence of liquidity and inflation risk premia, that increase the size of the 
spread between the nominal treasury and the TIPS.  
3.4 Independent Variables 
One of my independent variables is lagged inflation because it can be used to measure 
backward looking inflation expectations. The monetary aggregates M1 and M2 are used to 
address Friedman‟s theory that an increase in money supply is positively correlated to an 
increase in future inflation and this theory could be reflected in inflation expectations. The 
nominal treasury bonds are used as a means to measure the relationship between nominal yields 
and future short term and long-term inflation. The federal funds rate, similarly, can be seen as a 
direct measure of monetary policy control, and hence a change in the overnight rate could have a 
significant impact on short run future inflation.  In order to test whether the variance in stock 
market returns correlates to inflation expectations, the S&P 500 Total returns index is included 
as an independent variable. Lastly, I have also calculated and used the output gap and 
unemployment gap because they measure excess capacity in the economy and consequently price 
pressures, which help form rational expectations.  
An output gap can be defined as the difference between actual and potential GDP, as a 
percentage of GDP. Therefore, if expectations are significant when regressed upon the output 
gap, it can be inferred that forecasters are make rational inflation forecasts.   
Output Gap =  
Yt represents GDP in real terms whereas Yp represents potential output. In the long run, 
potential output of the economy is determined by how efficiently the economy is capable of 
allocating and utilizing the available factors of production for a given level of productivity. 
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However, in the short run, spurts of aggregate demand can drive the levels of demand far above 
long-term output expectations. This creates excessive demand pressure in the goods market that 
leads to rapidly increasing inflation. The reverse is true if the economy under-produces, a 
condition that would which would subsequently lead to lower levels of inflation
10
. In order to 
estimate the output gap, a Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to separate the trend component and the 
cyclical component of real GDP levels. The trend is representative of potential output as it is a 
broad growth curve around which GDP in terms of output fluctuates. 
The unemployment gap, much like the output gap, helps predict whether forecasters are rational 
and forward-looking when making inflation expectations. The Philips curve states that the 
relationship between inflation and unemployment is inverse and hence this would be observable 
by looking at the deviation of unemployment in the economy, as a measure of how inflationary 
trends would occur.  Therefore, the rationality of expectations can be accurately gauged by 
measuring the movement in the unemployment gap. The unemployment gap can be defined as: 
Unemployment Gap =   –     , 
     is defined as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, the level of 
unemployment below which inflation rises. The hypothesis put forward by Milton Friedman 
states that in order for any given labor market to exist, there must be a certain degree of 
unemployment, both frictional and classic. An exogenous shock leading to unexpected inflation 
would lower unemployment below the natural rate, but unemployment would revert back once 
inflation expectations adjust themselves. 
                                                          
10 Monetary Bulletin, 2005 - 1 
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       can be defined as the actual unemployment in the economy. Therefore, unemployment gap, 
if positive, indicates that the natural rate of unemployment is higher than the unemployment rate, 
which decreases in inflation expectations, and lowers price pressure in the economy. A larger cap 
is indicative of higher unemployment and hence lower inflation, therefore forcing the Federal 
Reserve to adjust inflation upward.  
3.5 Short Run vs. Long run Inflation Forecasts 
 Given the sensitivity of inflation forecasts and the ability to change inflation expectations 
over a longer period of time, I will be testing two additional variables which are measured over a 
longer period of time (10 years). I will be using the 10-year TIPS inflation forecasts as well as 
the 10-year forecasts from the Cleveland model.  By doing so, I will be able to accurately 
measure the deviation between short run and long run interest rates and how crucial of a role 
exogenous shocks play in affecting both short term and long run inflation expectations.  
4. Methodology 
The papers introduced in the literature review help to conclude that inflation expectations are 
the key determinant to helping shift an economy from a liquidity trap when monetary policy is 
completely ineffective. I am aiming to uncover the relationship between inflation expectations 
set by consumers, professional economists, the market, and various macroeconomic variables. 
My starting point is two canonical models of expectations. The first is backward looking and 
adaptive: 
1 t
e
t   , whereby inflation expectations are based on the median price level in the period t-1 
and expectations are subsequently formed using a price lag of one period. 
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Or forward looking and rational: 
 t
e
t E    , whereby inflation expectations are formed using an implicit model of the economy 
and all the available information.  
I regress my gathered inflation forecasts, on the aforementioned macroeconomic variables 
which would contribute to or have a significant effect on formation of inflation expectations. 
Since most of these forecasts are short-term 1 year forward forecasts, I will also use two long-
term forecasts to try to decipher how long term expectations differ from short term 
expectations when the factors contributing to these forecasts are the same for both time 
periods.  
Because time series data usually displays autocorrelation I model the error as AR(1). As 
previously discussed, all variables are first differences to ensure stationarity. Denoting the first 
difference with a hat, the regression form is:  
   
                                                      
                                       
                          
    
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Lagged Consumer Price Index, Unemployment & Output Gap   
 In order to understand how short run inflation expectations are formed and whether or not 
they are driven by price pressures or by adaptively looking at the (CPI) in the previous period, I 
regress the short-term inflation expectations on a one period lagged CPI as well as on both the 
unemployment and output gap.  Since both output gap and unemployment gap explain one in the 
same effect of price pressures in the economy, I avoid running both regressions together.    
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Table 2.1 regresses the survey based inflation expectations on the output gap and lagged 
CPI in regressions (1) and (3). Both regressions reflect that professional economists and 
consumers are more receptive to a change in the CPI from period t-1. They also help conclude 
that potential price pressures caused by output gaps would have no significant effect on survey-
based expectations. To measure whether Friedman‟s theory on the inverse relationship between 
inflation and unemployment holds true, regressions (2) and (4) measure the effect of the 
unemployment gap and a single period lagged CPI on the same set of inflation expectations. As 
expected, an increase in the size of the unemployment gap, which can be explained as a larger 
difference between the natural and actual unemployment rate, would lead to a decrease in future 
inflation because forecasters would expect high unemployment to lead to lower inflation in the 
future period. Therefore, while regressions (1) and (3) reflect that survey forecasters are purely 
backward looking and non responsive to price pressures, regressions (2) and (4) help conclude 
that while there is a strong correlation between lagged CPI and inflation expectations, there is no 
correlation between unemployment gap and survey inflation expectations.  
I regress the Cleveland Federal Reserve‟s inflations expectations model, as well the 
inflation expectations derived from the TIPS, on the same independent variables to measure 
whether the market inflation expectations are rational or adaptive in nature. The results in Table 
2.2 lead to very interesting conclusions. Unlike the survey-based forecasters, who are much more 
sensitive to the lagged consumer price index, both the dependent variables lack statistical 
significance and are not correlated to the independent variables. Regressions (1) and (3) in table 
2.2 do not display a statistically significant correlation between an increase in the lagged CPI as 
well as an increase in the output gap. Regressions (2) and (4) reflect that while these market 
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expectations are not correlated to a change in the lagged CPI, an increase in the unemployment 
gap has a significant and negative effect on the market‟s future inflation expectations.  
The regressions performed in Table 2.1 and 2.2 help conclude that survey forecasters are 
more backward looking when forming expectations given the statistical significance of the 
lagged CPI, while market expectations are more rational or forward looking and hence react 
sensitively to price pressures in the economy.  
 I regress long run inflation expectations derived from both the TIPS and as the Cleveland 
model on the output gap, unemployment gap and the lagged CPI. Based on economic theory, one 
would expect there to be abatement in price pressures in the long run and a convergence between 
actual and natural output and unemployment. Therefore expectations would be more receptive to 
changes in lagged inflation as opposed to changes in the unemployment gap. Regressions (2) and 
(4) in table 3.1 reflect the economic assumptions underlying long run inflation expectations. The 
unemployment gap is statistically insignificant when regressed upon by long run inflation 
expectations derived from both the Cleveland model and the TIPS. The magnitude of change in 
future inflation when regressed upon lagged CPI displays strong statistical significance. 
Therefore, while short run market inflation expectations are receptive to price pressures, long run 
market expectations are more sensitive to changes in inflation in period (t-1).  
5.2. Monetary Aggregates 
Given the inferences made on the effect of actual inflation and price pressure on the 
rational and adaptive inflation forecasts, I regress a number of other variables on these 
expectations while controlling for the effects of both inflation and price pressure. Therefore, I 
regress the monetary aggregates M1 and M2 (money supply) on the same set of inflation 
expectations. M1 can be defined as the sum of the tender held by outside banks, traveler‟s 
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checks, checking accounts net of the money supply held in the Federal Reserve float. The 
Federal Reserve can adjust this amount by adjusting the amount held in their float, hence either 
increasing or decreasing the quantity of M1 in the economy. M2 or money stock is the sum of 
small denomination time deposits, M1, and savings deposits. By adjusting the money stock, the 
Federal Reserve could control aggregate demand and hence inflation in the economy. 
 The regressions in 2.3 show that when there are price pressures present in the economy, 
the Fed would increase the supply of monetary aggregates to allay the pressure as well as 
increase inflation in the economy. Economic theory would suggest inflationary expectations 
increase when money supply in the economy increases significantly. Regression (1) in table 2.3 
shows that while professional forecasters react positively to lagged inflation, they react 
negatively to an increase in the money supply. A possible explanation for this occurrence is an 
increase in inflation expectations by a larger percentage than the increase in money supply. I 
suspect that there is reverse causality between these variables whereby the Fed attempts to 
measure future inflation and hence increases the monetary base by less than is expected. 
Consumers react similarly to an increase in the monetary base, and the negative correlation is 
statistically significant.  
The Cleveland model behaves in a similar manner; M2 is statistically significant while 
the lagged CPI has a positive and statistically significant effect on the inflation expectations 
derived from the model. The model is adjusted to smoothen short run exogenous shocks to the 
economy and is catered to react to changes that will have sustained long run effects on inflation, 
I assume that it is extremely challenging to capture the effects of short run changes in the 
macroeconomic variables. In his paper on gauging inflation expectations using the new 
expectations model, Joseph Aubrich states; “In the short run, there are price pressures, 
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unemployment effects, and shifts in money demand that move the price level around in ways that 
are out of the control of the central bank. What‟s needed is a longer-term measure of inflation 
expectations that purges out the short-term effects.” 11 Therefore, price pressures are statistically 
insignificant when regressed upon this set of inflation expectations.  
The TIPS is significantly correlated to M2 as well. The expansion of the economy‟s 
monetary base would cause a large shift in the real interest rate, which should have adverse 
effects on the nominal yield as well, given a change in consumer savings and investments. Since 
the TIPS inflation expectations are not correlated to either of the control variables, it is hard to 
explain what is driving down their expectations when the money supply is increased. Another 
possible reason for a significant decrease in expectations may be low level of credibility of the 
Fed perceived by forecasters.  
 In order to measure the effect of an increase in the monetary base on long run inflation 
expectations, I regress the long term inflation expectations on M1 and M2. Economic theory 
suggests that long run inflation expectations should react positively to an increase in the 
monetary base, and the magnitude of the relationship would be measured by how credible the 
Fed is perceived to be by the forecasters. In table 3.2 regression (1), the TIPS long run inflation 
expectations behave similarly to the short run inflation expectations. There is negative 
correlation between the monetary supply, M2 and long run inflation expectations derived by the 
10 year TIPS yield. This is surprising, as I would have expected to see a statistically significant 
and positive increase in the TIPS inflation expectations. Given the size of the dataset and the size 
of the liquidity premiums associated with the long term yield of the TIPS, the results could 
possibly be skewed. The long run inflation expectations forecasted by the Cleveland model react 
differently from those made in the short run. The long run expectations are adjusted upward 
                                                          
11 Haubrich, Pennachi and Ritchken, 2009. 
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when the Federal Reserve expands the monetary base. This explains that because the Cleveland 
model is smoothened for short run effects, the effect of any independent variable change on 
inflation expectations made by the model are extremely different. Since the lagged CPI is 
statistically significant in regression (2), we can assume that expectations increase based on a 
change in the CPI within period (t-1). Hence when the Fed increases money supply (M2), future 
inflation is adjusted upward.  
 
5.3 Federal Funds Rate 
The federal funds rate serves as an indicator of the level of liquidity and volume of 
depository reserves in an economy. In order to gauge whether inflation expectations are heavily 
based on where the Federal Reserve sets the overnight federal funds rate, I regress the short run 
dependent variables on the quarterly change in the federal funds. Regressions (1) and (2) in table 
2.4 display that both sets of survey forecasters are extremely sensitive to changes in the federal 
funds rate and have a significant and negative relationship with the this rate. An increase in the 
federal funds rate would lead to a disinflation because as the cost of borrowing increases, 
forecasters realize that businesses would be less willing to draw loans and hence inflation would 
be adjusted downward.  
I regress the TIPS inflation expectations on changes in the federal funds rate per period 
with the expectation of a strong correlation between the two variables given the high volume of 
transactions which occur when Open market operations are conducted, which would have an 
adverse effect on the short term yield of government bonds. During a contractionary monetary 
policy, the volume of government bonds in the private market increases, changing the yields of 
both the conventional bonds and the TIPS. Therefore, the difference in the yield along with a 
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potential increase in the inflation risk premium could account for a change in the expected 
inflation derived from TIPS. This could have an adverse effect on the relationship between 
inflation expectations derived from the TIPS and a change in the federal funds rate, as shown in 
table 2.6. On the other hand, the inflation expectations derived from the Cleveland model, are 
statistically significant and negatively correlated to the federal funds rate, hence supporting the 
economic theory that an increase in the overnight rate has a disinflationary effect on future 
prices.  
In table 3.3, I regress long term inflation expectations on the change in the federal funds 
rate. Similar to the reactions of the short run inflation expectations, the long run inflation 
expectations derived from the 10-year TIPS are not correlated with shifts in the federal funds 
rate. My hypothesis holds strong when looking at the inflation expectations forecasted by the 
Cleveland model. There is a negative and significant relationship between an increase in the 
federal funds rate and long run inflation expectations. This negative relationship signifies that 
inflation expectations in the long run decrease marginally but move in the same direction as short 
run inflation expectations, confirming that a change in the federal funds rate will negatively 
affect future inflation in the long run.  
5.4 Nominal Treasury Bill Yield Curves 
In order to gauge whether the inflation expectations are being driven by the yield curve 
and if there is a significant correlation between nominal interest rates and inflation expectations, 
I regress both short and long term inflation expectations on quarterly changes between the 10 and 
30 year yield curve.  
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Looking first at the survey forecasters, the regressions in table 2.5 show that there is no 
correlation between the change in the 10 year nominal yield and inflation expectations. The 
nominal yield of government treasuries is influenced by the conditions of the economy, and the 
demand of these treasuries is controlled by the economy‟s outlook on the volatility present 
within the market, which subsequently affects the yield of these instruments. When the yield on 
treasuries increases, the price of those securities decreases significantly, therefore allowing for 
market agents to secure a higher rate of return on their investment. Hence, we would expect to 
see an increase in the inflation expectations when the yield on US treasuries increases. In order 
to measure the change in short term inflation expectations I added in the change in the yield of 
the one year treasury as well. Table 2.5 (1), (2) and (3) show that a positive increase in the one 
year treasury yield has positive and significant effect on short term inflation expectations. 
Furthermore, the ten year and thirty year treasury yields are also positively correlated with short 
inflation expectations, showing that forecasters adjust expectations positively when the yield of 
both short and long term treasury bills change. The inflation expectations derived from the TIPS 
is negative and insignificant because the expected inflation decreases mathematically when the 
nominal yield increases, since the expected inflation is the difference between the nominal and 
TIPS yield. Since the TIPS are viewed as a flight to safety security from the risk of higher 
inflation, it can be inferred that an inflation risk premium would affect the expected inflation 
derived from the TIPS.  
 I regress long term inflation expectations on the change in the ten year and thirty year 
treasury yield in table 3.4. Long term inflation expectations are strongly correlated with the 
change in nominal yield curves for both the ten and thirty year treasuries allowing us to assume a 
positive relationship between inflation expectations and the yield on the ten and thirty year 
 
 
23 
 
nominal treasury yield. This indicates that a higher yield curve implies a positive future effect on 
inflation, which may not be realized in the short run. Long term interest rates are often viewed as 
the average of individual short term interest rates. However because forecasters cannot correctly 
measure what the yield will be in the next year, long term bonds have an embedded term 
premium in their yields that could additionally affect the long run expectations
12
.  
5.5 Standard & Poor’s 500 Total Returns Index  
 The Standard & Poor‟s (S&P) 500 Total returns index measures the total stock market 
return per quarter. I used this index as an independent variable to test whether there is any 
correlation between the formations of future inflation expectations and the performance of the 
S&P 500. Table 2.6 demonstrates that the relationship between the S&P total returns index and 
inflation expectations are insignificantly correlated for the survey forecasters and the inflation 
expectations derived from the Cleveland model. Surprisingly, there is a significant correlation in 
(4) between the inflation expectations derived from the TIPS and a positive change in the S&P 
500 total returns. Given that bond traders would be most receptive to stock market, an increase in 
the S&P 500 returns would signal a lower demand for low yield, secure bonds such as 
government treasuries and the TIPS. It is probable that a lower demand for these securities affect 
the volume in which they are traded, hence causing a change in their price and yield. This could 
be attributed to an increase in inflation expectations as the spread between the TIPS and 
conventional bonds increases. This effect is similarly prevalent in the long run, as is reflected in 
table 3.6.  
6. Conclusion 
The objective of my research was to determine how market agents form expectations about 
future inflation and  I used the two models of rational and adaptive expectations to achieve this 
                                                          
12 Haubrich, Pennachi and Ritchken, 2009. 
 
 
24 
 
goal. The literature referred to in this paper  is based on analysis of Keynesian liquidity traps and 
highlights the importance of inflation expectations in determining future output and prices 
Additionally, I looked at a simple model of the economy to determine which macroeconomic 
variables have statistically significant effects on these inflations. That being said, this thesis does 
not aim to measure causal relationships between macroeconomic variables, but instead aims to 
analyze which of these independent variables would be used by forecasters when basing where 
inflation in the economy would be in subsequent periods.  
 The discrepancy in information between different markets is the reason why I use 
inflation expectation forecasts made by professional economists, consumers, the financial market 
as well as a set of inflation expectations derived using a combination of the other three variables. 
Due to the time series sensitivity of the data set, I calculate the first difference for all the 
variables on a per quarter basis to ensure stationarity in my data. 
   Comparative time series regressions performed holding inflation expectations as the 
dependent variable reflect that consumers and professional economists are more sensitive to a 
change in the lagged period inflation, hence characteristic of an adaptive forecaster. The inflation 
expectations derived by the TIPS and the Cleveland model are more sensitive to an increase in 
the unemployment gap, representative of price pressures in the economy. Considering that they 
are statistically significant and negatively correlated to the unemployment gap, we can infer that 
this set of forecasters form their inflation expectations rationally, basing their forecasts on the 
size of the unemployment gap in the current period. The long run inflation expectations are also 
adaptive because they differ greatly due to price pressure abatements in the long run.  
 Regressing the inflation forecasts on various other macroeconomic variables while 
controlling for lagged inflation and unemployment gaps help to conclude that a change in both 
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the federal funds rate and the yield on government treasuries have a statistically significant 
relationship with both sets of forecasters. The other macroeconomic variables, while having a 
statistically significant correlation with certain sets of inflation forecasts, are not uniform across 
inflation expectations. Therefore they not have a large enough effect to cause a substantial 
change in the future inflation.  
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 Michigan Survey Survey of Professional 
Forecasters 
Cleveland Survey TIPS Inflation 
Expectations 
Survey 
Population 
Cross section of 
general public.  
Market economists. Nominal Interest 
rates, Inflation 
swaps, Michigan 
Survey and Survey 
of Professional 
Forecasters.  
Based on market 
inflation 
expectations. 
Survey 
Organization 
Survey Research 
Centre, University 
of Michigan.  
Originally ASA/NBER, 
currently the 
Philadelphia Federal 
Reserve. 
Cleveland Federal 
Reserve.  
United States 
Treasury.  
Starting Date Qualitative and 
Quantitative 
responses: Q1 – 
1980.  
GDP Deflator and CPI 
Inflation: Q1 1980. 
Changes in CPI 
inflation. Q1 1982  
Difference between 
nominal yield and 
TIPS yield. Q3 1997.  
Periodicity All quarters from 
Q1 - 1980 to Q1 – 
2009.  
All quarters from Q1 - 
1980 to Q1 – 2009. 
Monthly from Q1 - 
1982 to Q1 – 2009.  
Monthly from Q3 – 
1997 to Q1– 2009.  
Inflation 
Expectations 
Expected change in 
price over next 12 
months.  
GDP deflator levels and 
Quarterly CPI levels. 
Expected change in 
CPI over time period 
ranging from one 
month to thirty years.  
Expected change in 
the quarterly yield 
between bonds of the 
same maturation.  
Table 1.2: Summary of Forecasters 
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Variable Description Source 
SPF_CPIpct Quarterly percentage change in inflation expectations 
made by the Survey of Professional Forecasters 
Federal Reserve of Philadelphia 
MSCAB_CPIpct Quarterly percentage change in inflation expectations 
made by the Michigan survey of consumer attitudes and 
behaviors 
University of Michigan Survey Datasets 
CLFEDINF_pct Quarterly percentage change in inflation expectations 
made by the Cleveland Federal Reserve‟s model  
Federal Reserve of Cleveland 
TIPSINFL_pct 
Quarterly percentage change in inflation expectations 
calculated by the difference in the 1 year TIPS yield and 
conventional 1 year treasury yield 
Bloomberg Datasets 
CLFLT_pct Quarterly percentage change in long run inflation 
expectations made by the Cleveland Federal Reserve‟s 
model 
Federal Reserve of Cleveland 
TIPSLT_pct Quarterly percentage change in inflation expectations 
calculated by the difference in the 10 year TIPS yield and 
conventional 10 year treasury yield 
Bloomberg Datasets 
CPI_pct Quarterly percentage change in actual inflation measured 
by consumer price index 
Global Financial Data 
Outputgap_pct Quarterly percentage change in output gap, calculated 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
Global Financial Data 
M1_pct Quarterly percentage change in the supply of monetary 
aggregate, M1 
Federal Reserve of Saint Louis 
M2_pct Quarterly percentage change in the supply of monetary 
aggregate, M2 
Federal Reserve of Saint Louis 
FFR_pct Quarterly percentage change in the overnight federal 
funds rate 
Global Financial Data 
tenyr_pct Quarterly percentage change in the 10 year treasury yield Global Financial Data 
thrtyyr_pct Quarterly percentage change in the 30 year treasury yield Global Financial Data 
oneyr_pct Quarterly percentage change in the 1 year treasury yield Federal Reserve of Saint Louis 
unempgap_pct Quarterly percentage change in output gap, calculated 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
Global Financial Data 
spy_pct 
Quarterly percentage change in the overnight federal 
funds rate 
Federal Reserve of Saint Louis 
Table 1.2: Summary of Variables 
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Figure 2: Change in Short Run inflation expectations between 1980q1 and 2009q1.  
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Figure 3: Federal Reserve of Cleveland’s Model as compared to TIPS and 
Inflation Swaps 
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Short Run Inflation Expectations 
 
Table 2.1: Regressing 1-year forward professional inflation forecasts on a single period 
lagged consumer price index, output gap and unemployment gap 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SPF_CPIpct SPF_CPIpct MSCAB_CPIpct MSCAB_CPIpct 
          
CPI_pct 2.726*** 2.706*** 6.012*** 5.962*** 
 
(0.548) (0.515) (1.000) (1.022) 
outputgap_pct 0.00568 
 
0.00488 
 
 
(0.00430) 
 
(0.00959) 
 unempgap_pct 
 
-0.00710 
 
-0.00874 
  
(0.00459) 
 
(0.00691) 
Constant -3.218*** -3.123*** -4.996*** -4.844*** 
 
(0.684) (0.629) (1.492) (1.640) 
     Observations 117 117 117 117 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.2: Regressing 1-year forward inflation expectations from the TIPS and the 
Cleveland Federal Reserve on a single period lagged consumer price index, output gap and 
unemployment gap 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CLFEDINF_pct CLFEDINF_pct TIPSINFL_pct TIPSINFL_pct 
     
CPI_pct -3.322 -2.951 0.0881 -0.0344 
 (3.936) (3.566) (0.341) (0.122) 
outputgap_pct -0.00594  -0.00196  
 (0.0346)  (0.00177)  
     
     
unempgap_pct  -0.0196*  -0.00423*** 
  (0.0116)  (0.00046) 
Constant -2.106 -1.961 -0.216 0.0118 
 (11.23) (11.1) (0.492) (0.291) 
     
Observations 117 117 49 49 
 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.3: Regressing 1-year forward inflation forecasts on federal monetary aggregates, 
M1 and M2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SPF_CPIpct MSCAB_CPIpct CLFEDINF_pct TIPSINFL_pct 
          
CPI_pct 2.106*** 4.487*** 6.518*** 0.0810 
 
(0.763) (1.278) (1.377) (0.0578) 
unempgap_pct -0.00735 -0.00930 -0.00835 1.30e-05 
 
(0.00511) (0.00682) (0.00786) (0.000284) 
M1_pct 0.000965 0.00160 -0.00403 0.000233 
 
(0.00803) (0.0202) (0.0156) (0.000496) 
M2_pct -0.0551*** -0.123*** -0.0824** -0.00451*** 
 
(0.0189) (0.0377) (0.0403) (0.00118) 
Constant 0.113 2.515 -1.076 0.212*** 
 
(1.155) (2.667) (2.507) (0.0803) 
     Observations 117 117 117 49 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.4: Regressing 1-year forward inflation forecasts on the per period change in the 
overnight federal funds rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SPF_CPIpct MSCAB_CPIpct CLFEDINF_pct TIPSINFL_pct 
          
CPI_pct 1.805*** 5.127*** 6.016*** 0.149** 
 
(0.662) (1.175) (1.102) (0.0601) 
unempgap_pct -0.00642* -0.00816 -0.00651 0.000325 
 
(0.00382) (0.00696) (0.00714) (0.000374) 
FFR_pct -0.159*** -0.138** -0.272*** 0.00205 
 
(0.0331) (0.0669) (0.0516) (0.00366) 
     Constant -2.137*** -3.948** -4.638*** -0.0779 
 
(0.725) (1.857) (1.267) (0.0551) 
     Observations 117 117 117 49 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5: Regressing 1-year forward inflation forecasts on the change in the one, ten and thirty-year 
treasury yields 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SPF_CPIpct MSCAB_CPIpct CLFEDINF_pct TIPSINFL_pct 
          
CPI_pct 1.428** 4.142*** 3.640*** 0.101** 
 
(0.674) (1.298) (1.195) (0.0454) 
unempgap_pct -0.00572 -0.00677 -0.00404 0.000128 
 
(0.00401) (0.00742) (0.00706) (0.000471) 
tenyr_pct 0.375*** 0.534** 0.518** 0.0167*** 
 
(0.104) (0.231) (0.244) (0.00436) 
thrtyyr_pct 0.471*** 0.729** 1.322*** 0.0184* 
 
(0.131) (0.332) (0.310) (0.00945) 
oneyr_pct 0.180*** 0.225* 0.254*** -0.00108 
 
(0.0403) (0.131) (0.0809) (0.00233) 
     Constant -1.699** -2.810 -2.036 -0.0205 
 
(0.751) (2.024) (1.295) (0.0494) 
     Observations 117 117 117 49 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.6: Regressing 1-year forward inflation forecasts on the S&P 500 Total Returns Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SPF_CPIpct MSCAB_CPIpct CLFEDINF_pct TIPSINFL_pct 
CPI_pct 2.730*** 5.967*** 7.594*** 0.162*** 
 
(0.542) (1.008) (0.996) (0.0512) 
unempgap_pct -0.00691 -0.00857 -0.00815 2.65e-05 
 
(0.00455) (0.00684) (0.00817) (0.000416) 
spy_pct -0.0473 -0.0419 0.0240 0.0142*** 
 
(0.0798) (0.171) (0.166) (0.00501) 
Constant -3.004*** -4.725*** -6.391*** -0.102* 
 
(0.615) (1.614) (1.173) (0.0565) 
     Observations 117 117 117 49 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Long run Inflation Expectations 
Table 3.1: Regressing 10 year forward market inflation forecasts as predicted by the 
Cleveland Federal Reserve on a single period lag consumer price index and output gap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TIPSLT_pct TIPSLT_pct CLFLT_pct CLFLT_pct 
          
CPI_pct 12.67*** 13.90*** 4.188*** 4.267*** 
 
(2.604) (2.591) (0.912) (0.935) 
outputgap_pct 0.0219 
 
0.00571 
 
 
(0.0202) 
 
(0.00369) 
 unempgap_pct 
 
0.0376 
 
0.000132 
  
(0.0282) 
 
(0.00401) 
Constant -7.919* -9.635** -3.958*** -4.056*** 
 
(4.143) (4.152) (0.916) (0.917) 
     Observations 49 49 109 109 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.2: Regressing long run inflation forecasts on federal monetary aggregates, M1 and 
M2 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TIPSLT_pct CLFLT_pct 
      
CPI_pct 7.632** 2.878*** 
 
(3.098) (1.106) 
unempgap_pct 0.0167 5.71e-05 
 
(0.0225) (0.00371) 
M1_pct 0.0247 0.00653 
 
(0.0469) (0.00882) 
M2_pct -0.342*** 0.0783*** 
 
(0.0858) (0.0185) 
   Constant 12.84** 0.479 
 
(5.950) (1.317) 
   Observations 49 109 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3: Regressing long run inflation forecasts on the per period change in the overnight 
federal funds rate 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TIPSLT_pct CLFLT_pct 
      
CPI_pct 11.78*** 3.026*** 
 
(4.070) (0.992) 
unempgap_pct 0.0378 0.000949 
 
(0.0238) (0.00375) 
FFR_pct 0.233 -0.158*** 
 
(0.223) (0.0434) 
Constant -7.775 -2.900*** 
 
(4.762) (0.944) 
   Observations 49 109 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.4: Regressing long run inflation forecasts on the change in the ten and thirty year 
treasury yields 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TIPSLT_pct CLFLT_pct 
      
CPI_pct 7.718*** 1.414* 
 
(2.367) (0.726) 
unempgap_pct 0.0169 0.00172 
 
(0.0363) (0.00341) 
tenyr_pct 1.366*** 0.110* 
 
(0.242) (0.0659) 
thrtyyr_pct 1.811*** 0.866*** 
 
(0.547) (0.0914) 
   Constant -2.459 -0.866 
 
(2.682) (0.735) 
   Observations 49 109 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5: Regressing long run inflation forecasts on the S&P 500 Total Returns Index 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TIPSLT_pct CLFLT_pct 
      
CPI_pct 13.46*** 4.255*** 
 
(2.767) (0.988) 
unempgap_pct 0.0149 -8.65e-05 
 
(0.0272) (0.00401) 
spy_pct 1.106*** 0.0509 
 
(0.328) (0.0797) 
   Constant -10.34** -4.193*** 
 
(4.655) (0.973) 
   Observations 49 109 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
